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2004: A Year of Mixed Messages 
From the Court 
Jamie Cameron* 
Predicting Supreme Court of Canada decision making can be risky 
business. At Osgoode Hall’s Constitutional Cases conference, which 
was held on April 15, 2004, this presentation claimed that the Court, at 
present, can be described as a “play it safe” institution. That observation 
was tempered, a little, by the suggestion that the Court has also shown 
“institutional mettle” in a couple of instances. This assessment predated 
its blockbuster decision in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 
which was released, literally, as the conference publication went to 
press.
1
 The question is whether Chaoulli discredits that view of the 
Court. 
In Chaoulli, the Court invalidated Quebec’s prohibition on private 
health insurance, which was aimed at protecting the state’s monopoly on 
health care services. While Deschamps J. provided the tie-breaking vote 
under Quebec’s Charter of human rights and freedoms, the rest of the 
panel comprising seven judges in all faced off evenly on the question 
whether restricting access to private health insurance violated section 7 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
2
 Given the 2004 
jurisprudence, which either rejected most claims under the Charter or 
decided them narrowly, Chaoulli came as a surprise. For the time being, 
it is unclear whether this should be regarded as an isolated decision, or 
understood as a sign of renewed activism. In general, the Court under 
Chief Justice McLachlin is cautious, and has chosen its moments of 
intervention under the Charter with care. Knowing the perils of doing 
so, this comment predicts that Chaoulli will not set off a wave of activ-
ism at the Court; it suggests, instead, that the decision should be seen as 
an exception to the current temper of risk-averse adjudication.  
                                                                                                                                
*
  Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1
  [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35 (decided June 9, 2005). 
2
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”] While the Chief Justice and Major J., with Bastarache J. concur-
ring, wrote that the legislation violated s. 7 of the Charter in the circumstances, Binnie and LeBel 
JJ. wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Fish J. concurred. 
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I. PLAYING IT SAFE 
Before Chaoulli, those who advocate strong judicial enforcement of 
Charter entitlements must have been sorely disappointed: from the end 
of 2003 to the present, the Court dismissed the claim in a run of cases 
which includes: R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine;
3
 Canadian Foundation 
for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General) (the “s. 
43 Case”);
4
 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General);
5
 Re: Application 
under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code;
6
 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of 
Human Resources Development);
7
 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. 
N.A.P.E.;
8
 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General);
9
 and, in 2005, Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney Gen-
eral).
10
 Offsetting those Charter losses are R. v. Demers, which invali-
dated Criminal Code provisions concerning those who are unfit to stand 
trial,
11
 the Quebec cases on freedom of religion,
12
 Vancouver Sun (Re), 
which applied the open court principle to investigative hearings under 
the Anti-terrorism Act,
13
 and R. v. Mann, which placed judge-made 
limits on police powers of search incident to investigative detention.
14
  
To compare, last year’s conference highlighted Charter victories on 
equality, in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin
15
 
and Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General);
16
 on the rights of 
the Métis in R. v. Powley;
17
 and on remedies arising from a minority 
language education claim, in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister 
                                                                                                                                
3  [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571. 
4  [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76. 
5  [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827. 
6  [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248. 
7  [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357. 
8  [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381. 
9  [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657. 
10  [2005] S.C.J. No. 15, 2005 SCC 15 (March 31, 2005). 
11  [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489. 
12
  Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, and 
Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650. 
13
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332.  
14
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59. 
15
  [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504. 
16
  [2003] S.C.J. No. 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835. 
17
  [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207. 
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How different it looks this year. In that, it is not the results alone 
that are significant. Early in 2004, the claim may have failed in several 
cases, but not without generating rich debate among members of the 
Court, which emerged in the form of thoughtful concurring or dissenting 
opinions.
19
 Last fall, the Court shifted to a no-nonsense style of deci-
sion-making, which, spoke in one voice and resolved Charter claims 
efficiently, with analytical skill and precision. The decisions which fit 
that description include Hodge, N.A.P.E., Auton, Reference re Same-Sex 
Marriage,
20
 and the Quebec Language Education Cases.
21
  
In same ways, this is not an unwelcome development. For years, 
commentators groused about the Court’s practice of issuing prolix and 
repetitive opinions, including lengthy concurrences; these efforts were 
considered more an indulgence than a contribution to the jurisprudence. 
In such circumstances, it would be unfair to fault the Court’s newfound 
respect for effective, economical writing. It is also difficult to criticize 
the judges for their record of unanimity in these cases: when members 
of the Court agree on points of interpretation, it has a stabilizing and 
legitimizing effect on the Charter jurisprudence.  
At the same time, these benefits are not without other consequences, 
which should also be pointed out. For one, it would be unfortunate if 
unanimity created an impression that the issues at stake in cases like 
Auton or N.A.P.E., to give two examples, were neither difficult nor 
important enough to prompt differences of opinion. By presenting a 
united front in Hodge, N.A.P.E., Auton and the Quebec Language Edu-
cation Cases, the Court made it seem as though the issues were not 
especially challenging; if lower courts or the public thought differently, 
the Court set matters straight in a single opinion that determined the 
outcome conclusively, without apparent doubt or hesitation. Unanimity 
                                                                                                                                
18
  [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, [2003] 31 S.C.R. 3. See Cameron and Monahan, “Constitutional 
Cases 2003: An Overview” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d), at 2. 
19
  See R. v. Malmo-Levine, supra, note 3; the Section 43 Case, supra, note 4; Harper, su-
pra, note 5, and the Anti-terrorist cases: the Section 83.28 Application, supra, note 6, and Vancou-
ver Sun, supra, note 13. 
20
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 
21
  Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 15, 2005 SCC 15. 
See also Casimir v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, 2005 SCC 16; and Solski 
(Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 14, 2005 SCC 14. 
18  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
also imposes constraints on the decision-making process, which can 
result in reasons that are narrow or mechanical in nature.
22
 Concurring 
and dissenting opinions which at times seem like a bother and a nui-
sance nonetheless offer a point of resistance to conformist thinking. 
What was missing in this period of unanimity was dialogue between the 
judges and, with such dialogue, any indication that members of the 
Court were prepared to take risks in their interpretation of the Charter. 
In the absence of a dynamic tension between competing visions of the 
Charter and the Court’s mandate to enforce its entitlements, ideas can 
stagnate.  
It should also be remembered, as a matter of context, that the Court 
sat as a panel of seven in many of these cases and, in addition, that it 
was regrouping in the fall of 2004 after the departure of Justices 
Iacobucci and Arbour, and arrival of new Justices Abella and Charron. 
That said, to the extent it appeared as though members of the Court had 
fallen into a habit of agreeing with each other too easily, Chaoulli pro-
vided a reassuring sign that healthy debate is alive at the highest Court.  
II. SHOWING INSTITUTIONAL METTLE  
Two cases which tested the Court’s mettle in the fall of 2004 de-
serve further comment. First is the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, 
which posed four questions to the Court for an advisory opinion.
23
 From 
an institutional perspective, the Court’s refusal to answer one of the four 
is the key point of interest here. Second is Newfoundland v. N.A.P.E. 
and the appellate opinion of Marshall J.A., who challenged the Court’s 
section 1 jurisprudence and called for reform of the Oakes test.
24
 In 
response, the Court maintained that reforms were unnecessary but al-
lowed limits based on budgetary considerations just the same.  
It is accepted that the Court has a duty to answer reference ques-
tions, and that its discretion to withhold a response is limited to rare 
circumstances. That discretion has been exercised no more than a few 
times in recent memory, when the Court concluded that an answer 
                                                                                                                                
22
  See, e.g., Auton, [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 which dealt with the consti-
tutional entitlements of autistic children, in large part, through an analysis of comparator groups 
under s. 15. 
23
  Supra, note 20. 
24
  Supra, note 8. 
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would be institutionally awkward or inappropriate.
25
 The Court’s refer-
ence opinions have characteristically taken a broad view of whether and 
to what extent it is permissible for the judges to comment on issues, 
including those which either are not strictly legal or not strictly neces-
sary to decide. This approach led Peter Hogg to comment that the Court 
has been “astonishingly liberal in the questions it elected to answer,” 
and has not made “sufficient use of its discretion not to answer a ques-
tion posed on a reference.”
26
 
The federal government’s reference to the Court on gay marriage in-
itially presented three questions about its constitutional status before 
adding a fourth, which asked whether a requirement that marriage be 
limited to opposite sexes violated the Charter. As the second question 
already raised the issue of gay marriage under the Charter, it was un-
clear what value the fourth added to the reference.
27
 After concluding 
that same sex marriage is consistent with the Charter, the Court refused 
to consider whether an opposite sex definition is unconstitutional. In its 
unanimous opinion the Court said it was not obligated to answer that 
question, for two reasons. First, as the government had announced that it 
would legislate gay marriage, no matter what the judges said, the 
Court’s opinion quite obviously served no legal purpose.
28
 Though the 
judges can hardly be blamed for feeling insulted and trivialized in the 
circumstances, the absence of a purpose which was strictly legal in 
nature had not deterred the Court from responding in other reference 
proceedings. Moreover, on that reasoning, it might have refused to an-
swer any of the questions: the “no legal purpose” rationale could apply 
to the entire reference, not just the fourth question.
29
  
                                                                                                                                
25
  See, e.g., Reference Re Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada in Relation to 
the Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 (declining to answer certain questions relating to Senate 
reforms). 
26
  P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd., 1997), 
at 228. 
27
  Question 2 asked: “[I]s section 1 of the proposal, which extends capacity to marry to 
persons of the same sex, consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?” Question 
4 then asked: “Is the opposite-sex requirement for marriage ... as established by the common law 
and [Quebec legislation] consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?” Same-Sex 
Marriage Reference, supra, note 20, at para. 2. 
28
  Id., at para. 65. 
29
  There is a difference between the first three questions and the fourth: while the others 
addressed the constitutionality of a legislative proposal, the final question revived the constitution-
ality of opposite sex marriage; the Court noted that the Martin government had rejected that re-
quirement; in the circumstances, there was no need to provide advice.  
20  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Second, the Court claimed that the government’s decision not to ap-
peal the lower court decisions on point essentially estopped it from 
asking the same question on a reference. More specifically, the judges 
found that it would be unfair to put rights which had vested in the inter-
im at risk. In addition, answering the fourth question could put the Su-
preme Court’s advisory opinion in conflict with decisions which had not 
been appealed. Put bluntly, what the Court meant was that if the federal 
government wanted a legal answer to a legal question, it should have 
appealed those decisions. 
Yet the federal government was not required to appeal those deci-
sions, and the Court is required to answer reference questions. Though 
the judges said they could not be influenced by “a presumed outcome” 
in facing the threshold question whether to address the fourth question, 
it is unimaginable that the Court would give inconsistent answers.
30
 
Once having found that the Charter permits gay marriage, it would be 
difficult for the judges to turn around and at the same time uphold an 
opposite sex requirement that effectively prohibits it. In other words, the 
answer to the fourth question was at least implicit in the way the Court 
responded to the second one.  
It is likely that the judges resented the federal government’s oppor-
tunism in foisting the responsibility for gay marriage onto the Court. 
This is why, a peevish response was perfectly understandable. It is also 
possible that the Court did not want that responsibility, and chose to 
protect itself from the criticism it would have attracted had it declared 
that conventional, heterosexual marriage is unconstitutional. Thus it 
found cover in the contention that an answer, which it would have been 
obligated to provide on appeal, could be ducked when it came before the 
judges in the form of a reference question.  
There are other elements of the Same-Sex Marriage Reference 
which suggest that the Court did its best to discharge its duty as narrow-
ly and unobtrusively as possible. A quick comparison between this ref-
erence and the Secession Reference illustrates the point.
31
 There, as well, 
the federal government put the Court in an awkward position by asking 
it three easy questions which would bolster its position vis-a-vis Que-
bec, in the event of yet another referendum question on separation. Nor 
                                                                                                                                
30
  Same-Sex Marriage Reference, supra, note 20, at para. 61. 
31
  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
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could the Court have been enthusiastic, in those circumstances, about 
being placed in that position. Not only did the Court answer all the ques-
tions posed, in doing so it created a theory of unwritten principles and 
then used it to invent a constitutional duty to negotiate, in the hypothet-
ical circumstances of a clear referendum question resulting in a clear 
majority for separation. At the same time, the Court insisted in the Se-
cession Reference that it had not, and would not, address political ques-
tions. Yet, in creating the duty to negotiate it managed to forge a 
compromise despite being required to address questions which, by legal 
criteria, could only have been answered in the federal government’s 
favour.  
The Court’s judgment in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference stands 
in marked contrast. There is little, if anything, to note or remember in 
these reasons other, perhaps, than the Court’s refusal to answer the 
fourth question. Yet the judges could have seen the reference as an op-
portunity to confirm and reinforce lower court opinions on gay mar-
riage. This would have been important, not only in principle, but in 
practical terms as well, given grave doubts, at the time, about whether 
the federal government’s proposed legislation would pass. Significantly, 
the Court chose not to take that step. That choice showed institutional 
mettle, in the Court’s refusal to permit itself to become a pawn in the 
political battle over gay marriage. But it also revealed that the Court was 
unwilling to take the risk of being criticized for confirming what the 
lower courts had already found, that an opposite sex requirement is 
unconstitutional. That is how showing institutional mettle and playing it 
safe converged in the circumstances of the Same-Sex Marriage Refer-
ence.  
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E. also raised institutional 
issues which were different in nature, but equally interesting.
32
 The 
question there was whether Newfoundland was justified in deferring 
wage adjustments, which female employees in the health care sector 
were entitled to under a pay equity agreement, because of an intervening 
financial crisis. At first impression, N.A.P.E. must have looked to the 
Court like a no win situation: enforcing the agreement over the prov-
ince’s claims of fiscal duress would have invited the usual criticisms 
about judicial interventionism; at the same time, allowing Newfound-
                                                                                                                                
32
  Supra, note 8. 
22  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
land to defer its obligations might send the message that governments 
can renege whenever complying with the Charter became too expensive. 
The challenge for the Court was to take the province’s claim of financial 
emergency seriously without allowing the case to be seen as a contest 
between rights and dollars. 
N.A.P.E. also placed the Court’s methodology and section 1 juris-
prudence in issue. Justice Marshall, of the Newfoundland Court of Ap-
peal, attained notoriety for his “attack” on the Supreme Court for 
intruding into the policy domain. He proposed that a “separation of 
powers” principle be incorporated into the section 1 analysis to reflect 
and recognize the institutional deference that he, Marshall J.A., thought 
the Supreme Court should show the other branches of government. In 
particular, he spoke of the “need” to revisit the “three gateways to pro-
portionality”, and “if not to completely reframe them, at least to oil their 




Doctrinally, a further complication arose from Lamer C.J.C.’s une-
quivocal statement in the Provincial Judges’ Reference, that “a measure 
whose sole purpose is financial, and which infringes Charter rights, can 
never be justified under s. 1.”
34
 Justice Binnie undertook the delicate 
task in N.A.P.E. of explaining why Newfoundland was allowed to defer 
its obligations under the pay equity agreement. In doing so, he avoided 
the force of Lamer C.J.C.’s “financial exception” to the concept of rea-
sonable limits by drawing a distinction between “normal” budgetary 
considerations, and those which attain the dimension of a financial cri-
sis.
35
 In “weighing a delay in the timetable for implementing pay equity 
against the closing of hundreds of hospital beds,” he said, the govern-
ment was not engaged in an exercise whose “sole purpose” was finan-
cial, but in one that had “as much to do with social values” as with 
dollars.
36
 To reinforce the point that the Court did not view it as a con-
test between the two, he added that “[t]he government in 1991 was not 
just debating rights versus dollars but rights versus hospital beds, rights 
                                                                                                                                
33
  [2002] N.J. No. 324, 221 D.L.R. (4th) 513, at para. 365. 
34
  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of P.E.I., [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 284 (emphasis added). 
35
  Supra, note 8, at para. 64. The language he employs here is reminiscent of the emergen-
cy and dimension doctrines of the peace, order and good government jurisprudence. 
36
  Id., at para. 72. 
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versus layoffs, rights versus jobs, rights versus education and rights 
versus social welfare. The requirement to reduce expenditures, and the 
allocation of the necessary cuts was undertaken to promote other values 
of a free and democratic society.”
37
 As a result, the seven members 
panel agreed that it was reasonable to defer pay equity, in a time of 




The Oakes test and section 1 jurisprudence was flexible enough to 
permit an emergency exception to the general principle that budgetary 
considerations do not justify limits on Charter rights. That made it un-
necessary to address the proposal to incorporate a “separation of pow-
ers” principle at different stages of the Oakes test. As to that, Binnie J. 
simply held that current doctrine “already provides the proper frame-
work in which to consider what the doctrine of separation of powers 
requires in particular situations”, and added that Marshall J.A. had “not 
made out a persuasive case for its modification.”
39
 
Putting a separation of powers gloss on the Oakes test was unper-
suasive for more than one reason. The idea of cluttering the section 1 
analysis with additional steps which must be undertaken to determine 
reasonable limits makes little sense. At the same time, although his 
proposal may not have been feasible, Marshall J.A. hit a nerve when he 
took the Supreme Court’s section 1 jurisprudence on. In the circum-
stances, Binnie J. found a way to allow limits based on fiscal considera-
tions, without retreating from the Oakes methodology. The Court 
defended that methodology and the integrity of its section 1 jurispru-
dence in N.A.P.E., but did so without resolving the contest between 
dollars and rights, or addressing the institutional issues Marshall J.A. 
spoke of, which unavoidably arise from that contest. Though it was 
unrealistic to expect the Court to adopt his proposal, N.A.P.E.’s reliance 
on an “emergency exception” left the status of budgetary considerations 
unclear. That question has already resurfaced in cases which were heard 
in the fall of 2004, and are under reserve at present.
40
 
                                                                                                                                
37
  Id., at para. 75 (emphasis in original). 
38
  Id., at para. 97. 
39
  Id., at paras. 115 and 116. 
40
  Bodner v. Alberta, [2002] A.J. No. 1428, 222 D.L.R. (4th) 284 (C.A.) (rejecting the 
government’s reasons for rejecting the commission’s recommendations on judicial remuneration); 
Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice), [2003] 
N.B.J. No. 321, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 38 (C.A.) (upholding the government’s reasons for rejecting the 
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The constitutionalization of judicial remuneration led inexorably to 
the question whether judges are entitled to salaries and benefits which 
governments say they cannot afford to pay. More to the point, the issue 
is whether and by what standard the courts should review the decision 
by governments to reject the recommendations of “independent judicial 
commissions.” These commissions were established because the Su-




It is beside the point that the decision to constitutionalize judicial 
remuneration was one of the Court’s least defensible interpretations of 
the Charter, as the commissions have been established and cannot now 
be undone.
42
 At the time, the Court proposed a compromise between the 
Charter’s requirement that judicial independence be protected by the 
creation of remuneration commissions, and the government’s responsi-
bility to pay judicial salaries, benefits and pensions from the public 
purse. That compromise did not settle whether a commission’s recom-
mendations will prevail, unless the government meets a relatively strict 
standard of justification in explaining their rejection, or whether the 
government should have the final word on judicial remuneration, under 
a deferential standard of review. The fundamental problem is that, in 
principle, the compromise is incoherent: if a province cannot determine 
remuneration without undermining the judiciary’s independence, a 
commission’s recommendations should be binding; if not, judicial inde-
pendence will necessarily be undermined every time the government is 
allowed to reject its recommendations. It does not help that the rejection 
of any such recommendations is subject to review, which makes judges 
decision makers in their own or their brethren’s cause. 
It is not surprising that appellate courts applied different standards 
of review and reached different conclusions on these issues.
43
 In sorting 
it all out, the Supreme Court may be able to base its decision in each 
                                                                                                                                
commission’s recommendations on judicial remuneration); Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario 
(Management Board), [2003] O.J. No. 4155, 67 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.) (upholding the government’s 
decision to reject the commission’s recommendations on judicial remuneration); and Conférence 
des juges du Quebec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2004 R.J.Q. 1450 (concluding that the govern-
ment’s response to the recommendations did not meet the test of rationality). 
41
  [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
42
  For a critique, see J. Cameron, “The Written Word and the Constitution’s Vital Unstated 
Assumptions” in Thibault, Pelletier and Perret, eds., The Challenges of Constitutionalism: Essays in 
Honour of Gérald-A Beaudoin (Quebec: Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc., 2002) 89, at 97-103. 
43
  Supra, note 40. 
(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 2004: A Year of Mixed Messages 25 
 
case on the particular issues at stake in different provinces. But the larg-
er question, which lurks nonetheless, is whether governments are enti-
tled to reject recommendations for the remuneration of judges, for 
financial reasons. The dilemma there is that N.A.P.E. allowed an emer-
gency exception, but otherwise confirmed that mere budgetary consid-
erations cannot defeat Charter entitlements. Applying that principle in 
the judicial remuneration cases could mean that commission recommen-
dations will be enforced against reluctant governments, when the claims 
of less privileged workers, such as Newfoundland’s female health sector 
employees, were not. If the cases on judicial remuneration come out that 
way, the Court will be chastized for looking after its own, while allow-
ing limits on the claims of those who are less fortunate. The Chief Jus-
tice has impeccable instincts on matters of institutional politics, and 
likely would not favour results that enforce benefits for members of the 
judiciary, but not for health sector employees.  
Whether the Court showed more institutional mettle or aptitude for 
playing it safe in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference and in N.A.P.E. is a 
question of interpretation. At the least, it is apparent that this Court is 
acutely aware of its institutional position: the vulnerabilities as well as 
the strengths of that position. This awareness is a positive development, 
as the Court has in the past exercised its power of review in seeming 
disregard of the consequences of its ambitions for the Charter. This is, to 
some degree, the point Marshall J.A. was trying to make in N.A.P.E. As 
the 2004 jurisprudence shows, however, too much institutional caution 
can place a damper on the protection of rights. That is partly why 
Chaoulli v. Quebec is such a momentous decision: it is out of step with 
virtually all the jurisprudence of 2004 and early 2005. 
III. CHAOULLI V. QUEBEC44 
This conference will provide in-depth analysis of Chaoulli’s impli-
cations, for section 7 as well as for health care and other socio-economic 
entitlements, in April of 2006. At this stage, this paper attempts no more 
than three brief comments: this first has to do with the Court itself; the 
second, with section 7; and the third, with the broader implications of 
Chaoulli. 
                                                                                                                                
44
  Supra, note 1. 
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First, the division within the Court in this case has not escaped no-





 and the remaining judge also found the claim valid, 
thereby breaking the tie. In doing so, Deschamps J. chose to withhold 
her view of section 7 and base her decision on the Quebec charter of 
human rights and freedoms. Whether by design or not, the division is 
strategic, because it leaves the status of the Charter claim unresolved, 
thereby preserving the question of section 7’s interpretation for the full 
Court to debate. 
More of interest here is the coalition of judges who supported the 
section 7 claim, which includes the Chief Justice and Major J., as co-
authors of that opinion, along with Bastarache J., who concurred. This 
grouping, and the grounds on which it found a Charter violation, are 
significant because of Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General).
47
 There, a 
majority led by McLachlin C.J.C. held that Quebec’s decision to vary 
welfare benefits on grounds of age did not violate the Charter. The 
Chief Justice dismissed the claim on evidentiary grounds, and otherwise 
did not indicate whether she would be prepared to extend section 7 to 
matters falling entirely outside the administration of justice.
48
 Justice 
Bastarache, who also joined her opinion in Chaoulli, was adamant in 
Gosselin that section 7 required an administration of justice context.
49
 
He appeared incensed, in responding to Arbour J.’s dissenting opinion 
there, that she would suggest to the contrary. And then he did just that 
by agreeing with McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. in Chaoulli. In light of 
precedent, then, and especially Gosselin v. Quebec, the result in 
Chaoulli can only be regarded as a surprise. 
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  Justices Binnie, LeBel and Fish, dissenting (per Binnie and LeBel JJ.). 
46
  Chief Justice McLachlin, and Major and Bastarache JJ. (per McLachlin C.J. and Major 
J.). 
47
  [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429. 
48
  She did not indicate particular sympathy for that view, but nor did she rule an expansive 
interpretation of s. 7 out. Her brief opinion on the s. 7 claim focused on the two key points debated 
by Arbour and Bastarache JJ.: the administration of justice criterion and the permissibility of 
imposing a positive obligation on the state under s. 7. Id., at paras. 75-84. 
49
  For instance, he stated that “in certain exceptional circumstances, the Court has found 
that s. 7 rights may include situations outside of the traditional criminal context” but in Gosselin, 
there was “no link between the harm to the appellant’s security of the person and the judicial 
system or its administration”. Id., at para. 213 (dissenting opinion). He reiterated that the “strong 
relationship between the right and the role of the judiciary leads me to the conclusion that some 
relationship to the judicial system or its administration must be engaged before s. 7 may be ap-
plied”. Id., at para. 215 (emphasis added). 
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This leads to the second comment, which simply makes an observa-
tion about the basis of the McLachlin-Major opinion, and its Binnie-
LeBel counterpart. In Gosselin v. Quebec, Arbour J. urged the Court, 
quite unsuccessfully, to expand section 7 to matters outside the admin-
istration of justice, and to bring socio-economic issues into the Charter. 
She explained why section 7’s two clauses should be decoupled, and the 
guarantee of life, liberty and security of the person given independent 
substantive interpretation. She did not win support for that view in 
Gosselin,
50
 and nor was that view adopted in Chaoulli. Instead, the 
McLachlin-Major opinion found that Quebec’s prohibition on private 
health insurance violated section 7 because it was arbitrary.
51
 
The use of that standard reveals further intrigue in the evolution of 
the section 7 jurisprudence. Earlier, the Chief Justice had written the 
majority opinion in the Section 43 Case, which applied the three-part 
section 7 test from Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General)
52
 
to uphold that provision of the Criminal Code.
53
 But rather than apply 
that test or follow the lead of Arbour J. in Gosselin, she and Major J. 
focused on the problem of arbitrariness in Chaoulli. In that regard, it 
should be noted that she and Major J. also joined the majority opinion in 
R. v. Malmo-Levine, which likewise applied the three-part test from 
Rodriguez.
54
 Meanwhile, the Binnie-LeBel opinion in Chaoulli applied 
the Chief Justice’s three-part test of Rodriguez, Malmo-Levine and the 
Section 43 Case and came to the conclusion that Quebec’s prohibition 
on private health insurance did not violate section 7. The relationship 
between this test and the doctrine of arbitrariness is confusing, which is 
by way of saying that when the Court does not play it safe, it can be 
highly selective in applying its own doctrinal standards. 
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 Only L’Heureux Dubé J. concurred in Arbour J.’s views on s. 7 of the Charter.  
51
 Rather than adopt Arbour J.’s position, which would give the life, liberty and security of 
the person independent substantive content, the Chief Justice and Major J. applied a “traditional”  
s. 7 analysis and found that Quebec’s prohibition on private health insurance violated the principles 
of fundamental justice, on the ground that it was “arbitrary” in a constitutionally unsound way. 
Chaoulli, supra, note 1, at paras. 126-53. 
52
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
53
 Supra, note 4. There, she held that the s. 7 jurisprudence had established that a “principle of 
fundamental justice must fulfill three criteria”: first, it must be a legal principle; second, there must 
be a consensus that the principle in question is fundamental to a societal notion of justice; and third, 
the principle must be capable of being identified with precision and applied to situations in a 
manner that yields predictable results. Id., at para. 8. 
54
 Supra, note 3. 
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Finally, there is the question of Chaoulli’s implications. This is not 
the time or place to offer much beyond the obvious. In the circumstanc-
es of the 3-3-1 split, the decision’s implications for section 7 turn on two 
variables: one is what the two new judges who did not participate in 
Chaoulli think about section 7; the other is what the nature of the next 
claim is and whether a majority applies the guarantee’s prohibition 
against arbitrary laws or decides, instead, that the infringement must 
meet the also muddy but more structured criteria of the three-part test.  
IV. MIXED MESSAGES 
Though the remark was not directed at her colleagues, former Su-
preme Court of Canada Judge Louise Arbour said, in a speech delivered 
in winter of 2005, that Canadian courts have been timid in certain as-
pects of Charter interpretation.
55
 In terms of the recent jurisprudence, 
that assessment is partly correct and partly incorrect: with one glaring 
exception for Chaoulli v. Quebec, it is an accurate description of the 
Court’s work in 2004 and early 2005. As this comment has shown, a 
Court that focuses too much attention on institutional concerns will 
unavoidably constrain the scope of protection for rights.  
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  Specifically, she said: “The first two decades of Charter litigation testify to a certain ti-
midity — both on the part of litigants and the courts — to tackle head on the claims emerging from 
the right to be free from want”. L. Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
“‘Freedom From Want’ — from charity to entitlement” LaFontaine-Baldwin Lecture 2005, at 11. 
